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THE VOLCKER RULE, BANKING ENTITIES,
AND COVERED FUNDS ACTIVITIES
Jeffrey Koh* & Kyle Gaughan**
ABSTRACT
With the passage of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, Congress instituted a
host of new laws attempting to protect consumers from the types of risky
trading that led to the 2008 economic crisis.  However, many of the new
rules and regulations, including the Volcker Rule, are yet to fully take ef-
fect.  Among other restrictions, the Volcker Rule attempts to curtail risky
trading by limiting banking entity investments in private equity and venture
capital funds.  As the Volcker Rule nears its implementation deadline,
banking entities are concerned that they will face substantial losses in hav-
ing to comply with the Volcker Rule by being forced to sell their invest-
ments at fire-sale prices.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, Congress enacted the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).1
A variety of factors triggered the financial crisis, including poor safeguards
on mortgage lending, excessive packaging and sale of loans to investors,
and risky investments into loan-backed securities.2  As a result of the cri-
sis, Congress authorized the investment of $700 billion into the U.S. finan-
cial system through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), via a
variety of American banking entities.3  Congress established TARP to sta-
bilize the U.S. banking system, among other purposes.4  Together with
TARP, Dodd-Frank envisioned numerous new regulations on banking en-
tities to prevent the causes of the crisis from reoccurring in the future, and
to better “protect consumers from abusive financial services practices.”5
Dodd-Frank includes Section 619, an addition to the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 (the “BHCA”) entitled “Prohibitions On Proprie-
tary Trading And Certain Relationships With Hedge Funds And Private
Equity Funds,” which imposes new regulations on the American banking
industry.6  Section 619 of Dodd-Frank (and the regulations promulgated
thereunder) is commonly known as the Volcker Rule,7 and it generally
attempts to prohibit banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading
and from acquiring, retaining ownership interests in, sponsoring or having
certain relationships with private equity funds and hedge funds.8  The
Volcker Rule restrictions are complex and not ironclad; they cover invest-
ments in hedge funds and private equity funds, subject to a variety of qual-
ifications and exemptions.
1. Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.white
house.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform (last visited Sept. 10, 2014).
2. Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25,
2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/business/economy/26inquiry.html?_r
=0.
3. TARP Programs, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/finan
cial-stability/TARP-Programs/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Sept. 16, 2014); see Matthew
Ericson, Elaine He & Amy Schoenfeld, Tracking the $700 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, http://
www.nytimes.com/packages/html/national/200904_CREDITCRISIS/recipients.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 11, 2014) (listing which banks received funds and how much from TARP).
4. TARP Programs, supra note 3.
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. (2010) (enacted) (noting the Congressional purpose behind the passage of Dodd-
Frank) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
6. See Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Commission’s Rule
Under Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act (the “Volcker Rule”), U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (June 10, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-volcker-rule-
section13.htm.
7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, Title VI, § 619, 124 Stat. 1620, 1620-31 (2010) (codified as 12 U.S.C.
§ 1851 (2012)).
8. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND AND TIMELINE OF THE VOLCKER RULE
Dodd-Frank has been gradually (but not yet fully) implemented since
its passage in 2010.9  Drafters completed the Final Volcker Rule on De-
cember 10, 2013.10  This completion date fell well beyond the initial dead-
line of October 18, 2011 as initially contemplated by Dodd-Frank.11  The
complexity behind the Volcker Rule and Congress’s desire to ensure that
regulators passed a rule that sufficiently carried out Dodd-Frank’s aims
partially explained the extensive delay.12  In addition to the Volcker
Rule’s complexity, much of the delay occurred due to the contentiousness
behind the drafting of the Final Volcker Rule.13  While many supporters of
the Volcker Rule were adamant in their desire to curb risky investments,
banking entities were determined to continue to raise capital and make
investments without new restrictions.14  Even before Dodd-Frank’s pas-
sage in 2010, proponents of the Volcker Rule had begun to worry that the
discussed legislation would be watered down.15  Under the backdrop of
these concerns, regulators passed an initial draft in October 2011 that pro-
posed strict restrictions on banking activities.16  This initial draft caused an
uproar on Wall Street, which in turn led to extensive debates between pro-
Volcker Rule regulators and the banking industry.17  The extent of these
debates significantly delayed final formulation of the Volcker Rule.
9. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATORY RE-
FORM, FINANCIAL CRISIS LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT, 2
(2013) (“The Dodd-Frank Act has not yet been fully implemented; thus, its impacts have not
fully materialized.”).
10. OCC Bulletin 2014-9: Final Regulations Regarding the Volcker Rule, OFF. COMP-
TROLLER CURRENCY (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2014/bulle
tin-2014-9.html.
11. See Victoria McGrane & Aaron Lucchetti, Volcker Rule Delay Likely, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 12, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904265504576564623589787
108.
12. Id. (noting Julie Edwards, spokesperson for Democratic Senator Jeff Merkley as
stating “[t]he rule must be written right. If a small delay will help that process, it is
acceptable.”).
13. Alexander Eichler, Volcker Rule Deadline Likely Blown, Says Bernanke, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2012, 11:50 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/01/volcker-
rule-deadline_n_1313299.html (quoting former Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke as
stating regulators would have to resolve “a lot of very difficult issues” and process “about
17,000 comments” before a rule could fully implemented).
14. See id.
15. William Alden, War of Words over the Volcker Rule: A History, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
10, 2013, 10:38 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/war-of-words-over-the-volcker-
rule-a-timeline/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (noting Paul Volcker’s disappointment with
the dilution of the Final Rule).
16. See id.
17. See id. (noting Chief Executive of JPMorgan Chase Jamie Dimon’s critique of the
rule’s complexity, stating “[i]f you want to be trading, you have to have a lawyer and a psy-
chiatrist sitting next to you determining what was your intent every time you did something”
and Bart Chilton of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission stating “[w]e should never
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For instance, one of the many debates surrounding the Volcker Rule
concerned hedging.  While hedging is generally permitted, banking entities
argued that the Volcker Rule was overly prescriptive in its proposed regu-
lation of hedging.18  Specifically, banking entities and other critics of the
Volcker Rule suggested that institutions covered by the Volcker Rule
should be allowed to develop hedging policies and procedures that would
be approved by regulators, rather than being bound by the strict hedging
procedures required by the Volcker Rule.19  Critics claimed this would al-
low banking entities to continue to participate in certain forms of benefi-
cial trading while maintaining the prohibition on proprietary trading.20  In
response, proponents of the Volcker Rule argued that its strict require-
ments would still allow for hedging as a tool for managing risk, while
prohibiting hedging that would create “significant new risk exposure.”21
Nevertheless, despite these debates, the Federal Reserve’s Board of
Governors issued the Volcker Rule in its final form on December 10, 2013
(hereinafter referred to as the “Final Volcker Rule”).22
III. VOLCKER RULE REQUIREMENTS
The Final Volcker Rule establishes three main areas of “prohibitions
and restrictions on proprietary trading by, and investments in or relation-
ships with covered funds by, certain banking entities.”23  Subject to certain
exceptions,24 these three areas include: (1) a “prohibition on proprietary
trading,”25 (2) a requirement for banking entities of a certain size to de-
velop “a compliance program . . . to ensure and monitor compliance with
[these] prohibitions and restrictions on proprietary trading and covered
fund activities and investments” and to report permitted “proprietary
trading activity” over a certain threshold to a designated agency,26 and (3)
again be put in a circumstance where too-big-to-fail high-rollers play games of chance with
our nation.”).




21. See Steve Liesman, How Jamie Dimon Whiffed on the Volcker Rule, CNBC (June
13, 2012, 4:28 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/47803236 (arguing that if the Volcker Rule’s
prohibitions were in place, JP Morgan may not have suffered a $2 billion dollar loss due to
hedging transactions).
22. See 17 C.F.R. § 75 (2014); William L. Harvey, The Volcker Rule: It’s Time to Com-
ply, A.B.A. BANKING L. COMMITTEE: BUS. L. SEC. ANN. MEETING (2014).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 75.1(b) (2014).
24. See also Memorandum from the Staff of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys.
Seeking Approval of the Volcker Rule Regulations to the Bd. of Governors 2 (Dec. 9, 2013)
(on file with author), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/
board-memo-volcker-20131210.pdf [hereinafter Board of Governors Memo].
25. 17 C.F.R. § 75.3(b) (2014).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 75.10(d) (2014).
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a “prohibition on acquiring or retaining an ownership interest and having
certain relationships with a covered fund.”27
These prohibitions and restrictions apply to banking entities, which are
defined under the Final Volcker Rule to include: “(i) [a]ny insured deposi-
tory institution, (ii) [a]ny company that controls an insured depository in-
stitution, (iii) [a]ny company that is treated as a bank holding company for
purposes of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C.
3016), and (iv) [a]ny affiliate or subsidiary of any entity  described . . . in
(i), (ii) or (iii).”28  The definition of banking entities would therefore also
include, via 12 U.S.C. 3016, “(1) any foreign bank that maintains a branch
or agency in a State, (2) any foreign bank or foreign company controlling a
foreign bank that controls a commercial lending company organized under
State law, and (3) any company of which any foreign bank or company
referred to in (1) and (2) is a subsidiary.”29  Applying the definition of
covered fund discussed in Section III.C infra, the Final Volcker Rule pro-
vides that any “covered fund that is not itself a banking entity,”30 and any
“portfolio company” held under the BHCA’s authority31 or any “portfolio
concern . . . controlled by a small business investment company”32 (as long
as these are not themselves banking entities) do not fall within the defini-
tion of banking entity under the rule.
A. Prohibition on Proprietary Trading
The Final Volcker Rule generally prohibits banking entities from en-
gaging in proprietary trading,33 unless such proprietary trading qualifies as
a “permitted activity” under the Final Volcker Rule.34  Proprietary trading
refers to banking entities “engaging as principal for the trading account of
the banking entity in any purchase or sale of one or more financial
instruments.”35
A trading account would be “any account that is used by a banking
entity” to “purchase or sell one or more financial instruments” (i) “princi-
pally for the purpose of: (A) [s]hort-term resale, (B) [b]enefitting from
actual or expected short-term price movements, (C) realizing short-term
arbitrage profits, or (D) hedging one or more positions from the purchases
27. 17 C.F.R. § 75.10 (2014).
28. 17 C.F.R. § 75.2(c) (2014).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 3016(a).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 75.2(c)(2)(i) (2014).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 75.2(c)(2)(ii) (2014).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 75.2(c)(2)(ii) (2014).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 75.3(a) (2014).
34. Michael D. Bopp, et. al., The Final Volcker Rule, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 3
(Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/TheFinalVolckerRule
.pdf.
35. 17 C.F.R. § 75.3(a) (2014). See also Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary
Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private Equity
Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5535, 5538, (Jan. 31, 2014).
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or sales of financial instruments described in . . . (A), (B) or (C),” (ii)
covered under the “market risk capital rule,” or (iii) in connection with
any licensed or registered business of a dealer, swap dealer, or security-
based swap dealer.36
A financial instrument covered under the prohibition on proprietary
trading include “(i) [a] security, including an option on a security; (ii) [a]
derivative, including an option on a derivative; or (iii) [a] contract for sale
of a commodity for future delivery, or option on a contract of sale of a
commodity for future delivery”37 but does not include: “(i) [a] loan; or (ii)
[a] commodity that is not: (A) [a]n excluded commodity (other than for-
eign exchange or currency); (B) [a] derivative; (C) [a] contract for sale of a
commodity for future delivery; or (D) [a]n option on a contract of sale of a
commodity for future delivery; or (iii) [f]oreign exchange or currency.”38
As part of its prohibition on banking entities engaging in proprietary
trading, the Final Volcker Rule further contains a rebuttable presumption
that the “purchase (or sale) of a financial instrument by a banking entity”
is “presumed to be for the trading account of the banking entity . . . if the
banking entity holds the financial instrument for fewer than sixty days or
substantially transfers the risk of the financial instrument within sixty days
of the purchase (or sale).”39
Proprietary trading, as defined under the Final Volcker Rule, does not
include the purchase or sale of financial instruments by banking entities in
connection with: (1) repurchase or reverse repurchase agreements, (2)
temporary loans of financial instruments under which the lender retains
the underlying economic interests, (3) liquidity management in accordance
with a documented liquidity management plan, (4) serving as a derivatives
clearing organization or a clearing agency in connection with clearing fi-
nancial instruments, (5) excluded clearing activities by banking entities
that serve as a clearing agency, a member of a derivatives clearing organi-
zation, or a designated financial market utility, (6) satisfying existing cus-
tomer delivery or legal obligations, (7) their capacity as agent, broker or
custodian, (8) deferred compensation, stock-bonus, profit-sharing or pen-
sion plans, or entities serving as trustee for the benefit of employees, or (9)
the ordinary course of collecting a previously contracted debt, providing
that the banking entity divests the financial instrument as soon as
practicable.40
In addition, certain “underwriting and market making-related activi-
ties,”41 certain “risk-mitigating hedging activities,”42 and certain “permit-
36. 17 C.F.R. § 75.3(b)(1) (2014).
37. 17 C.F.R. § 75.3(c)(1) (2014).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 75.3(c)(2) (2014).
39. 17 C.F.R. § 75.3(b)(2) (2014).
40. 17 C.F.R. § 75.3(d) (2014).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 75.4 (2014).
42. 17 C.F.R. § 75.5 (2014).
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ted proprietary trading activities” involving domestic and foreign
government obligations, fiduciary transactions, riskless principal transac-
tions, insurance, and by certain foreign banking entities are permitted
under the Final Volcker Rule subject to restrictions.43  These activities
must not “(1) [i]nvolve or result in a material conflict of interest between
the banking entity and its clients, (2) [r]esult, directly or indirectly, in a
material exposure by the banking entity to a high-risk asset or a high-risk
trading strategy; or (3) [p]ose a threat to the safety and soundness of the
banking entity or to the financial stability of the United States.”44
A “material conflict of interest” exists if a transaction would lead to
the “banking entity’s interests being materially adverse to the interests of
its client, customer, or counterparty with respect to such transaction,”45
and the banking entity has not made “timely and effective disclosure” or
“established, maintained and enforced information barriers.”46  A “high-
risk asset” or “high-risk trading strategy” is defined as any assets or trad-
ing strategy, which would “significantly increase the likelihood that the
banking entity would incur a substantial financial loss or would pose a
threat to the financial stability of the United States.”47
B. Compliance and Reporting Requirements
The Final Volcker Rule requires each banking entity to “develop and
provide for the continuing administration of a compliance program rea-
sonably designed to ensure and monitor compliance with the prohibitions
and restrictions on proprietary trading and covered fund activities and in-
vestments” set forth in the rule.48  The compliance program should at a
minimum include: (1) “[w]ritten policies and procedures designed to docu-
ment, describe, monitor and limit trading activities” subject to the Final
Volcker Rule,49 (2) a “system of internal controls reasonably designed to
monitor compliance,”50 (3) a “management framework that clearly deline-
ates responsibility and accountability for compliance,”51(4) “independent
testing and audit of the compliance program conducted periodically,”52 (5)
“[t]raining for trading personnel and managers . . . to effectively imple-
ment and enforce the compliance program,”53 and (6) “[r]ecords sufficient
43. 17 C.F.R. § 75.6 (2014).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 75.7(a) (2014).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 75.7(b)(1) (2014).
46. 17 C.F.R. § 75.7(b)(2) (2014).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 75.7(c) (2014).
48. See 17 C.F.R. § 75.20 (2014).
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to demonstrate compliance.”54  If the banking entity engages in proprie-
tary trading permitted under the Final Volcker Rule, it will also have fur-
ther “reporting requirements,”55 and must regularly provide certain
documentation to the Commodity Futures Trading Commissions
(“CFTC”) if it has trading assets and liabilities above certain dollar
amount thresholds.56
C. Covered Funds
Subject to certain exceptions,57 the Final Volcker Rule prohibits bank-
ing entities from (i) as principal, directly or indirectly, acquiring or retain-
ing any ownership interest in or sponsor a covered fund,58 or (ii) entering
into certain relationships or transactions with covered funds, described be-
low.59  To “sponsor”60 means, with respect to a covered fund: (i) to “serve
as a general partner, managing member, or trustee of a covered fund, or to
serve as a commodity operator,”61 (ii) to “select or to control (or to have
employees, officers, or directors or agents who constitute) a majority of
the directors, trustees or management of a covered fund,”62 or (iii) to
“share with a covered fund, for corporate, marketing, promotional, or
other purposes, the same name or a variation of the same name.”63
1. Covered Funds Defined
Under the Final Volcker Rule, the definition of covered fund includes:
(i) an issuer that would be an investment company under the Investment
54. Id.
55. 17 C.F.R. § 75.20(c) (2014).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 75.20(d)(1) (2014).
57. Notwithstanding any exceptions provided in the Final Volcker Rule to the con-
trary, banking entities may not engage in any activity relating to a covered fund that would
“(1) [i]nvolve or result in a material conflict of interest between the banking entity and its
clients, customers, or counterparties; (2) [r]esult, directly or indirectly, in a material exposure
by the banking entity to a high-risk asset or a high-risk trading strategy; or (3) [p]ose a threat
to the safety and soundness of the banking entity or to the financial stability of the United
States.” 17 C.F.R. § 75.15(a) (2014). A “material conflict of interest” is defined as an activity
“that would involve or result in the banking entity’s interests being materially adverse to the
interests of its client, customer, or counterparty” with respect to such activity, 17 C.F.R.
§ 75.15(b)(1) (2014), which the banking entity has not made timely and effective disclosure or
established information barriers. 17 C.F.R. § 75.15(b)(2) (2014). A “high-risk asset” or “high-
risk trading strategy” is an asset or trading strategy that would “significantly increase the
likelihood that the banking entity would incur a substantial financial loss or would pose a
threat to the financial stability of the United States. 17 C.F.R. § 75.15(c) (2014).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 75.10(a)(1) (2014).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 75.14(a)(1) (2014).
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Company Act of 1940,64 but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act,65 (ii)
certain commodity pools under section 1a(10) of the Commodity Ex-
change Act,66 and (iii) certain foreign entities, not offering or selling in-
vestments in the U.S., that are, or holds themselves out as being, entities
or arrangements that raise money from investors primarily for the purpose
of investing in or trading securities.67
The definition of a covered fund under the Final Volcker Rule does not
include: (1) foreign public funds (organized outside the U.S. which offer
and sell ownership interests to retail investors in the issuer’s home jurisdic-
tion and sell ownership interests predominantly outside the U.S.), (2)
wholly-owned subsidiaries (up to 5% of the subsidiary may be owned by
employees or directors, and up to 0.5% by a third party if retained by third
party for corporate separateness or bankruptcy concerns), (3) joint ven-
tures, if not primarily for the purpose of investing in securities for resale or
trading, (4) acquisition vehicles formed solely for the purpose of engaging
in a merger or acquisition transaction, (5) foreign pension or retirement
funds, if organized and administered outside the U.S., (6) insurance com-
pany separate accounts, provided that no banking entity other than the
insurance company participates in the account’s profits and losses, (7)
bank owned life insurance, provided that no banking entity who purchased
the policy controls investment decisions regarding underlying assets, (8)
certain loan securitizations, (9) qualifying asset-backed commercial paper
conduits, (10) certain qualifying covered bonds, (11) small business invest-
ment companies and public welfare investment funds, (12) registered in-
vestment companies and excluded entities, (13) issuers in conjunction with
the FDIC’s receivership or conservatorship operations, or (14) any other
excluded issuer jointly determined by the appropriate Federal banking
agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and the
CFTC.68
2. Exceptions to Prohibitions on Ownership Interests in Covered Funds
i. Issuing; Underwriting and Market Making; Advisory Services
Despite the Final Volcker Rule’s prohibition to the contrary, a banking
entity is allowed to invest in or sponsor a covered fund “that is an issuing
entity of asset-backed securities in connection with . . . organizing and of-
fering that issuing entity”69 subject to certain requirements, or in relation
64. 15 U.S.C. § 0a-1 et seq.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) and (7). Sections 3(c)(1) and (7) of the Investment Com-
pany Act’s exemptions are available to companies that invest in or trade securities that pri-
vately offer securities beneficially owned by no more than 100 accredited investors or that
are owned exclusively by qualified purchasers.
66. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(10).
67. 17 C.F.R. § 75.10(b) (2014).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 75.10(c) (2014).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 75.11(b) (2014).
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to “underwriting and market making in ownership interests of a covered
fund,”70 subject to certain restrictions.
A banking entity may also invest in or sponsor a covered fund if:71 (1)
the banking entity “provides bona fide trust, fiduciary, investment advi-
sory, or commodity trading advisory services,”72 (2) the covered fund “is
organized and offered only in connection with the provision of bona fide
trust, fiduciary, investment advisory or commodity trading advisory ser-
vices and only to persons that are customers of such services of the bank-
ing entity,”73 (3) the banking entity does not otherwise acquire an
ownership interest in the covered fund not permitted under the Final
Volcker Rule74 and (4) complies with the Final Volcker Rule restrictions
on covered fund activities,75 (5) the banking entity does not insure the
obligations or performance of the covered fund,76 (6) the covered fund
does not share the same name or use the word bank in its promotional
materials,77 (7) directors or employees of the banking entity do not retain
an ownership interest in the covered fund,78 and (8) the banking entity
clearly discloses that the banking entity will not bear losses relating to the
covered fund beyond its ownership in the covered fund.79
ii. New Covered Funds
Subject to certain limits, a banking entity is also allowed to “acquire
and retain an ownership interest in a covered fund”80 that it organizes and
offers pursuant to the above described exceptions to establish a fund and
provide the fund “with sufficient initial equity for investment to permit the
fund to attract unaffiliated investors.”81  When a banking entity makes an
investment in these covered funds, the funds will not be considered affili-
ates of the banking entity.82  After providing initial equity financing to
such covered funds, the banking entity must “actively seek unaffiliated in-
vestors to reduce, through redemption, sale, dilution, or other methods,
the aggregate amount of all ownership interests of the banking entity in
the covered fund.”83
70. 17 C.F.R. § 75.11(c) (2014).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 75.11(a) (2014).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 75.11(a)(1) (2014).
73. 17 C.F.R. § 75.11(a)(2) (2014).
74. 17 C.F.R. § 75.11(a)(3) (2014).
75. 17 C.F.R. § 75.11(a)(4) (2014).
76. 17 C.F.R. § 75.11(a)(5) (2014).
77. 17 C.F.R. § 75.11(a)(6) (2014).
78. 17 C.F.R. § 75.11(a)(7) (2014).
79. 17 C.F.R. § 75.11(a)(8) (2014).
80. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(a) (2014).
81. Id.
82. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(b)(1)(iii) (2014).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(a)(2)(i)(A) (2014).
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Within one year of the banking entity providing capital to the covered
fund, the banking entity must limit its investment84 to no more than 3% of
the total ownership interest in the covered fund.85  This limitation consists
of two particular components: per fund limitations and aggregate limita-
tions.  First, a banking entity and its affiliates cannot invest more than 3%
in a single covered fund.86  For the single covered fund limitation, the in-
vestment calculation applies both to the total value of the fund and the
total number of ownership interests the banking entity has in a covered
fund.87  Second, the Final Volcker Rule limits a banking entity’ aggregate
investment in covered funds at 3% of an entity’s’ Tier 1 capital, which is
generally common stock and reserves.88
In order to determine whether the 3% ownership limitation has been
met, the proper calculation is either:
1. the aggregate amount of total shares owned by the banking entity divided
by the total amount of outstanding shares;89 or
2. the aggregate fair market value of the banking entities investment in the
covered fund divided by the fair market value of all other investments in
the covered fund.90
Once a selection has been made for calculating the 3% ownership limi-
tation, the banking entity must continue to use the same calculation
method.91
The 3% ownership limitation gave some bite to the Final Volcker Rule,
with further restrictions preventing certain potential loopholes.  For exam-
ple, if a “feeder fund” is created to invest substantially all of its assets in a
“master fund,” then the 3% ownership calculation will be based on the
banking entity’s investment in the “master fund” and not the “feeder
fund.”92  Additionally, if the banking entity establishes a covered fund for
the purpose of investing in other covered funds (a “fund of funds”), the
banking entity’s calculated interest will include the banking entity’s invest-
ment in the original fund, as well as the banking entity’s pro rata interest
in the fund of funds.93
If a banking entity believes that it will not be able to fall into compli-
ance with the 3% ownership interest, a banking entity may request a delay
in conformance with the Final Volcker Rule for up to two additional
years.94  When determining whether to grant an extension on compliance,
84. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(a)(2)(ii)(A), (B) (2014).
85. Final Volcker Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 255 (2014).
86. Prohibitions and Restrictions, 79 Fed. Reg. 5535, 5725.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 5728.
89. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(b)(2)(i) (2014).
90. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(b)(2)(ii) (2014).
91. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(b)(2)(iii) (2014).
92. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(b)(4)(i) (2014).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(b)(4)(ii) (2014).
94. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(e)(1) (2014).
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the Federal Reserve Board will consider the following factors: (1) whether
the investment will materially expose the banking entity to high-risk assets
or high-risk trading strategies,95 (2) the contractual terms governing the
banking entity’s interest in the covered fund,96 (3) the date on which the
covered fund is expected to reduce the banking entity’s interest to fall
within the Final Volcker Rule’s threshold,97 (4) potential exposure the
banking entity will face upon divestment and the risks this will pose to the
banking entity and the financial stability of the U.S.,98 (5) the cost to the
banking entity of divesting within the applicable timeframe,99 (6) whether
the divestment would result in a material conflict of interest between the
banking entity and an unaffiliated party to which the banking entity owes
a duty,100 (7) the banking entity’s prior efforts reduce its stake in the cov-
ered fund,101 (8) market conditions, and (9) “[a]ny other factor that the
Board believes appropriate.”102
During any extension period, the Board has discretion to impose any
conditions that it “determines are necessary or appropriate to protect the
safety and soundness of the banking entity or the financial stability of the
U.S., address material conflicts of interest or other unsound banking prac-
tices, or otherwise further the purposes” of the Final Volcker Rule.103
iii. Hedging Compensation Arrangements
The covered funds prohibition in the Final Volcker Rule also “does not
apply with respect to an ownership in a covered fund acquired or retained
a banking entity that is defined to demonstrably reduce or otherwise sig-
nificantly mitigate the specific, identifiable risks to the banking entity in
connection with a compensation arrangement with an employee of the
banking entity . . . that directly provides investment advisory, commodity
trading advisory or other services to the covered fund.”104  In order to rely
on this exemption, the banking entity must demonstrate that: (1) it has an
internal compliance program, including (A) reasonable written policies
and procedures and (B) internal controls and ongoing oversight;105 and
(2) the ownership interest is (A) made in accordance with the internal
controls, (B) directly related to hedging the compensation agreements
with the employee offering services to the covered fund, (C) does not give
95. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(e)(2)(i) (2014).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(e)(2)(ii) (2014).
97. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(e)(2)(iii) (2014).
98. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(e)(2)(iv) (2014).
99. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(e)(2)(v) (2014).
100. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(e)(2)(vi) (2014).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(e)(2)(vii) (2014).
102. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(e)(2)(ix) (2014).
103. 17 C.F.R. § 75.12(e)(3) (2014).
104. 17 C.F.R. § 75.13(a)(1) (2014).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 75.13(a)(2) (2014).
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rise to any significant new risk that is not hedged under this section, and
(D) is subject to continuous review, monitoring and management by the
banking entity.106
iv. Covered Funds Outside the United States
Non-U.S. banking entities may also acquire ownership interests in, or
sponsor, covered funds under the Final Volcker Rule if it occurs solely
outside the U.S.107  The banking entity may not be located in or organized
in the U.S. or controlled by a banking entity located in or organized in the
U.S.,108 and the ownership interests in the fund must be sold pursuant to
an offering that does not target U.S. persons (as defined in Regulation S
under the Securities Act of 1933).109  Such an offering must include dis-
claimers and adopt reasonable procedures to restrict access to non-U.S.
persons.110  Further, the banking entity and the relevant personnel making
sponsorship or investment decisions must not be located in the U.S., the
sponsorship or investment must not be accounted for on a consolidated
basis by any branch or affiliate of the foreign bank in the U.S., and no
financing for the foreign bank’s sponsorship of or investment in the fund
can be provided by any branch or affiliate located in the U.S. or organized
under U.S. law.111
D. Termination of Activities or Investments; Penalties for Violations
Any banking entity that “engages in an activity or makes an invest-
ment in violation of” or “acts in a manner that functions as an evasion of
the requirements of” the Final Volcker Rule, including “through an abuse
of any activity or investment” permitted by, or “otherwise violates the re-
strictions and requirements” of the Final Volcker Rule, shall “upon discov-
ery, promptly terminate the activity, and as relevant, dispose of the
investment.”112  If the FTC “finds reasonable cause to believe any banking
entity has engaged in an activity or made an investment in violation . . . or
that functions as an evasion” of the requirements of the Final Volcker
Rule, it “may take any action permitted by law to enforce compliance . . .
including directing the banking entity to restrict, limit or terminate any or
all activities [covered by the Final Volcker Rule] and dispose of any
investment.”113
106. Id.
107. 17 C.F.R. § 75.13(b) (2014).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 75.13(b)(1)(i) (2014).
109. 17 C.F.R. § 75.13(b)(1)(ii) (2014).
110. Id.
111. 17 C.F.R. § 75.13(b)(2)(B)(4) (2014).
112. 17 C.F.R. § 75.21(a) (2014).
113. 17 C.F.R. § 75.21(b) (2014).
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IV. CONFORMANCE PERIOD
The Federal Reserve Board (the “Board”) has delayed full implemen-
tation of the Final Volcker Rule by extending its conformance period until
July 21, 2015.114  In doing so, the Board has issued a statement of policy in
which it clarifies the activities and investments that are permissible for
banking entities during the conformance period.115  Unless an exception
applies, banking entities are required to ensure that their investments
comply with Final Volcker Rule guidelines no later than July 21, 2015.116
As explained in the Board’s Conformance Order, banking entities have
until the end of the conformance period to ensure that all of its proprie-
tary trading activities and covered fund activities and investments are in
conformance with the Final Volcker Rule.117  During the conformance pe-
riod, “a banking entity is expected to engage in good-faith efforts and ap-
propriate activities and investments that will result in the conformance of
its activities and investments.”118  Banking entities should not further ex-
pand covered activities or make investments during the conformance pe-
riod in expectation of a further extension of the conformance period
providing additional time for conformance.119
In determining what constitutes good-faith efforts, the Board has noted
that the banking entity must evaluate the extent to which its activities are
covered by the Final Volcker Rule and must work towards developing and
implementing policies that demonstrate how the banking entity intends to
become compliant with the Final Volcker Rule.120  In addition, under the
Conformance Order, the conformance period does not extend to any
stand-alone proprietary trading operations, and banking entities are ex-
pected to “promptly” terminate or divest such operations.121
The Federal Reserve Board is permitted to further extend the two-year
conformance period by up to three one-year periods.122  In addition to
these three one-year periods, the Final Volcker Rule further allows a
banking entity to apply for an extension of up to five years for investments
114. See Order Approving Extension of Conformance Period (Dec. 10, 2013) (on file
with author), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg201312
10b1.pdf [hereinafter Board Conformance Order].
115. Statement of Policy Regarding the Conformance Period for Entities Engaged in
Proprietary Trading or Private Equity Fund and Hedge Fund Activities, 77 Fed. Reg. 33,949
(June 8, 2012), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-70-policystatement.pdf.
116. Joint Press Release, Bd. Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., Agencies Issue Final Rules
Implementing the Volcker Rule (Dec. 10, 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/20131210a.htm.





122. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(c)(2).
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in certain illiquid funds.123  It is therefore possible that a banking entity
could receive extensions allowing for the maintenance of an investment in
an illiquid fund for up to eight more years, or until as late as July 2022.124
Illiquid funds include, for example, investments in startups or closely
held private companies not traded on a public securities exchange.125  In
order to qualify for the illiquid fund exception, banking entities must
demonstrate that their retention of interest in an investment is a contrac-
tual requirement entered into prior to May 1, 2010.126  Additionally, bank-
ing entities are required to use their best efforts to liquidate these
investments notwithstanding.  If an investment contract contains a regula-
tory-out clause allowing for the sale or redemption of interest, the illiquid
fund exception will not apply.127  This regulatory-out carveout to the illiq-
uid fund exception may prove to be critical for banking entities.  Many
fund managers would likely consent to banking entities liquidating their
shares in these funds, precluding application of the illiquid fund exception
and leaving banking entities in a precarious position.128  By being forced
to sell their investments at an earlier time, banking entities may find them-
selves locked into liquidating their investments at firesale prices129 and
forced to take substantial losses.
V. POTENTIAL IMPACTS & CRITICISMS
As currently drafted, the implementation of the Final Volcker Rule
may pose serious consequences for the banking industry.  One example of
an affected banking entity is Goldman Sachs.  In the second quarter of
2014, Goldman Sachs beat Wall Street’s estimates by $500 million.130  This
performance comes with a caveat—about $1.2 billion of the firm’s reve-
nues that quarter came from investment in private and public companies,
with a majority of this revenue coming from investments in private equity
funds.131  As such, Goldman Sachs and firms like it may have to forego a
substantial portion of their revenues as the Final Volcker Rule becomes
123. 76 Fed. Reg. 8265, 8275 (Feb. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 225).
124. See Jay G. Baris & Henry M. Fields, The Volcker Rule: Prohibition on Sponsorship
and Investment in Covered Funds, MORRISON FOERSTER (2014), http://media.mofo.com/files/
Uploads/Images/140206-Volcker-Rule-Prohibition-Sponsorship-and-Investment.pdf.
125. Andrew Ackerman & Ryan Tracy, Banks Push to Delay Rule on Investments,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2014, 6:17 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/banks-push-to-delay-
rule-on-investments-1407881847?mg=id-wsj&cb=logged0.36956217349506915.
126. Baris & Fields, supra note 124.
127. Id.
128. Ackerman & Tracy, supra note 125.
129. Id.
130. Stephen Gandel, Goldman’s Private Equity Problem is Getting Bigger, FORTUNE
(July 31, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/07/31/goldman-sachs-private-equity/.
131. Id.
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effective.  While Goldman Sachs marks its investments to market132 and
may not have to lock in additional losses in having to sell them, Goldman
Sachs’ private equity investment business is one of its most profitable.133
If forced to divest, Goldman Sachs may need to find a new way to earn
revenues, especially with its trading earnings continuing to slump.134
Other banking entities have already begun to liquidate their shares in
covered funds in anticipation of the Final Volcker Rule’s implementation.
For instance, even prior to the Final Volcker Rule’s completion in Decem-
ber 2013, JPMorgan Chase initiated plans to spin off its private equity arm,
One Equity Partners.135 While there is some question as to whether this
preparation was solely in anticipation of having to comply with the Final
Volcker Rule, JPMorgan Chase’s sale of its private equity arm indicated a
change in banking philosophy following the Final Volcker Rule’s pas-
sage.136  Other examples of this shift in banking philosophy include Ci-
tigroup, which had sold $8.5 billion of its private equity fund investments
as of January 2014,137 and Bank of America Merrill Lynch, which spun off
a $5 billion private equity arm in 2011.138
With banking entities already actively preparing for the Final Volcker
Rule’s implementation, one question is the consequences that will arise if
conformance is not further delayed.  Indeed, as this Comment previously
states, fund managers may be willing to allow banking entities to sell their
shares in covered funds, which would prevent banking entities from falling
under the illiquid fund exception.139  This may be problematic for the
banking industry.  Given that private equity tends to be a longer-term in-
vestment,140 simply divesting an investment before its planned exit is not
optimal.  By selling their stakes in advance of their intended maturity,
132. Under mark to market accounting, assets and liabilities are recorded at their mar-
ket value. Thus, the firm takes gains and losses each quarter as opposed to when it sells. This
means assets and liabilities will fluctuate with the market. For more information, see Fair
Value and Mark to Market Accounting, AM. BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.aba.com/Issues/In
dex/Pages/Issues_FairValue.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
133. Gandel, supra note 130.
134. Id.
135. Scott Gamm, JPMorgan to Spin Off Private Equity Business as Volcker Rule
Comes to Life, FORBES (June 14, 2013, 1:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottgamm/
2013/06/14/jpmorgan-to-spin-off-private-equity-business-as-volcker-rule-comes-to-life/.
136. Id.
137. Shayndi Raice, Citi Considers Selling Private-Equity Stake to Comply with Volcker
Rule, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Jan. 7, 2014, 7:29 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/01/07/
citi-considers-selling-private-equity-stake-to-comply-with-volcker-rule/.
138. Chris Nicholson, Bank of America to Spin Off Buyout Arm, N.Y. TIMES (April 20,
2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/20/bank-of-america-to-spin-off-buyout-arm/.
139. Ackerman & Tracy, supra note 125.
140. Martin Stein, Tony Kiehn & Jennifer Danzi, How Private Equity Really Works
(Part 1 of 2), IMAGING SPECTRUM MAG., Aug. 2007, at 32, available at http://www.blackford
capital.com/articles/How_Private_Equity_Really_Works_p1.pdf (noting that private equity
investment in portfolio companies lasts on average between 3-7 years).
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banking entities may lock in substantial losses on their investments or see
a very minimal return.
Outside of its impact on banking entities, the Final Volcker Rule also
directly affects private equity funds.  Because the banking entities impli-
cated by the Final Volcker Rule are large investors in private equity funds,
the private equity market risks losing a substantial amount of investors.
As noted previously, banking entities such as JP Morgan are already in the
process of spinning off their private equity investments.141  One option for
private equity funds may be to seek out smaller, non-accredited investors
as replacements.142  The NASDAQ OMX Group recently considered an
initiative to bring lower income, non-institutional investors into the private
equity space.143 Other groups, such as the Carlyle Group and Kohlberg
Kravis Roberts, have also considered similar plans.144
Of course, this strategy does not come without its drawbacks.  Private
equity funds have consistently sought to minimize the applicability of SEC
regulations through a variety of exemptions, including Rule 506 of Regula-
tion D.145 While appealing to non-institutional, non-accredited investors
has the potential to violate the Securities Act as well as the Investment
Company Act of 1940,146 Rule 506 of Regulation D is considered a “safe
harbor” under the private offering exemption of Section 4(a)(2) of the
Securities Act, allowing private equity funds to raise an unlimited amount
of funds without having to make a costly, full-fledged, and public registra-
tion with the SEC, subject to certain qualifications.147
Under Rule 506(c) of Regulation D, a private equity fund may under-
take the general solicitation of a private offering if all the investors in the
offering are accredited investors and the private equity fund has taken rea-
sonable steps to verify that the inventors are accredited investors.148  Ac-
credited investors are investors who meet certain criteria, including any
141. Gamm, supra note 135.
142. Regulation D defines a natural person as an accredited investor if that person’s
“net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds
$1,000,000” or if that person “had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the
two most recent years or joint income with that person’s spouse in excess of $300,000 in each
of those years and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the
current year.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2013).
143. William Alden, Private Equity Takes Steps Toward Wooing Smaller Investors, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 25, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/private-equity-takes-steps-to
ward-wooing-smaller-investors/.
144. Id.
145. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013).
146. Registration under the Investment Company Act of 1940 is exempted if the pur-
chasers are “qualified.” “Qualified purchasers” are those holding in excess of $5 million in
investments, well above the threshold for an accredited investor. See 50 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(51).
147. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2); see also Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2014).
148. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2013).
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natural person whose individual net worth (or joint net worth with that
person’s spouse) exceeds $1,000,000 or who had an individual income in
excess of $200,000 (or joint income with that person’s spouse in excess of
$300,000) in each of the two most recent years and who has a reasonable
expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year.149
Under Rule 506(b) of Regulation D, if there is no general solicitation,
a private equity fund may sell to an unlimited number of accredited inves-
tors and up to 35 non-accredited investors whom it considers to be sophis-
ticated, with sufficient “knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters [to be] capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the
prospective investment.”150  A private equity fund relying on Rule 506(b)
must generally provide non-accredited investors with disclosure similar to
that used in registered offerings and with any information it provides to
accredited investors.151  Many issuers may “avoid the difficulty of deter-
mining who is sophisticated” by restricting their offering to accredited in-
vestors.152  Further, an offering to non-accredited investors under
Regulation D may implicate the “qualified purchasers” exemption under
the Investment Company Act of 1940153 upon which private equity funds
may rely.
Outside of these regulatory implications, commentators have ques-
tioned the investment strategy of opening doors to smaller investors.  For
example, Josh Lerner, a professor at Harvard Business School has noted
that investments involving smaller investors may produce lower returns.154
Nevertheless, with the restrictions imposed on banking entities under the
Final Volcker Rule, private equity funds may have to open their doors to
investment by these demographics.
Beyond potential losses by banking entities or private equity funds,
other aspects of the Final Volcker Rule have invited criticism.  As previ-
ously noted, critics of the Final Volcker Rule question its very necessity,
with some claiming that the Final Volcker Rule does not really alleviate
what they consider to be the main cause of the financial crisis: the overex-
tension of credit and poor federal housing policy.155  Additionally, critics
have argued that the Final Volcker Rule holds too strong on the definition
149. 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (2012).
150. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2013).
151. Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/an
swers/rule506.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2014).
152. John Washburn & David Brown, Reg. D – More Popular than Ever?, GOULD &
RATNER (2006), http://www.gouldratner.com/Assets/News/JAW-Reg%20D.pdf.
153. Registration under the Investment Company Act of 1940 is exempted if purchasers
are “qualified.” “Qualified purchasers” are those holding in excess of $5 million in invest-
ments, well above the threshold for an accredited investor. See 50 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51).
154. Alden, supra note 143.
155. David M. Gallagher, Public Statement: Dissenting Statement Regarding Adoption
of Rule Implementing the Volcker Rule, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 10, 2013), http://
www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370540477693#.VH4L5GTF_9s.
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of covered funds by providing for a rebuttable presumption that a fund is
covered until it is proven otherwise, and these critics argue that the burden
should instead be on regulators to show that a fund should be covered.156
As the banking industry prepares for a world post-Final Volcker Rule
implementation, these changes may very well attract further attention as
members of the banking industry develop new ways to challenge or side-
step the Volcker Rule.  Legal challenges are possible, but may not be
likely to succeed.157  Practical challenges to the Final Volcker Rule may
take the form of finding loopholes to the restrictions covered in the Final
Volcker Rule.158  How these issues play out will be determined as the Fi-
nal Volcker Rule is further implemented.
VI. CONCLUSION
After years of debate, the Final Volcker Rule was enacted in Decem-
ber 2013.  Among the many regulations included in the Final Volcker Rule
is a limitation on banking entities’ investments in covered funds.  As the
Final Volcker Rule is implemented, the heavy investment of banking enti-
ties in private equity funds may lead to profound consequences affecting
both the banking industry and private equity industry.  The current draft
of the Final Volcker Rule may force many banking entities to liquidate
their investments in private equity funds prematurely.  If these invest-
ments are considered liquid for the purposes of the Final Volcker Rule
(and not subject to its illiquid fund exception), banking entities may face
substantial losses as they make efforts to become Final Volcker Rule
compliant.
156. Id. While Commissioner Gallagher’s December 2013 comments take issue with the
text of the Final Volcker Rule, it also indicates that the Final Volcker Rule text limits the
definition of covered funds as compared with the proposed rule’s text.
157. Simon Johnson, Making the Volcker Rule Work, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013, 5:22
PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/making-the-volcker-rule-work/?_php=
true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
158. See generally id.
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